Integration of migrants in Italy: A simple general and objective measure

Measuring migrants’ integration into host societies is a challenging task as, in general, measuring any social behavior and social phenomena. The task is affected by many specific problems related to the definition of the objective of study and the impact of subjective evaluations in the construction of an index. Our study aims to provide a measure of integration as much as possible general and objective. More in details, first, we consider some different general aspects of the integration problem related to migrants’ polarization, cultural diversification, social stability, integration in the labor market. Second, we aggregate them in a synthetic linear index, which is rather objective since the weights are computed by only considering the statistical properties of our dataset, i.e. choosing those weights that minimize the information loss in terms of data variances/co-variances.Migrations; migrants’ integration; regional index; principal component analysis

Integration of migrants in Italy: A simple general and objective measure

Measuring migrants’ integration into host societies is a challenging task as, in general, measuring any social behavior and social phenomena. The task is affected by many specific problems related to the definition of the objective of study and the impact of subjective evaluations in the construction of an index. Our study aims to provide a measure of integration as much as possible general and objective. More in details, first, we consider some different general aspects of the integration problem related to migrants’ polarization, cultural diversification, social stability, integration in the labor market. Second, we aggregate them in a synthetic linear index, which is rather objective since the weights are computed by only considering the statistical properties of our dataset, i.e. choosing those weights that minimize the information loss in terms of data variances/co-variances.migrations, migrants’ integration, regional index, principal component analysis

FISCAL-MONETARY POLICY COORDINATION AND DEBT MANAGEMENT: A TWO STAGE DYNAMIC ANALYSIS

This paper studies the interaction between two autonomous policymakers, the central bank and the government, in managing public debt as the result of a two-stage game. In the first stage the institutional regime is established. This determines the equilibrium solution to be applied in the second stage, in which a differential game is played between the two policymakers. It is shown that, if the policymakers can communicate before the game is played, (multiple-equilibrium) coordination problems can be solved by using the concept of correlated equilibrium. Unlike Nash equilibrium, which only allows for individualistic and independent behaviour, a correlated equilibrium allows formonetary and fiscal policies, differential games, correlated equilibrium.

Fiscal Policy under Balanced Budget and Indeterminacy: A New Keynesian Perspective

We investigate the effect of fiscal policy on equilibrium determinacy in a New Keynesian economy with rule-of-thumb (liquidity constrained) consumers and capital accumulation by focusing on the inter-action between monetary policy and taxation under the assumption of balanced budget. Our main finding is that taxation of firms� monopoly rents reduces the parameter range within which the Taylor principle is insufficient to guarantee equilibrium determinacy; hence it supports the determinacy of the rational expectation equilibrium.Rule-of-thumb consumers, equilibrium determinacy, fiscal and monetary policy inter-actions, tax distortions, balanced government budget.

Do tax distortions lead to more indeterminacy? A New Keynesian perspective

Following the recent developments of the literature on stabilization policies, this paper investigates the effect of tax distortions on equilibrium determinacy in a New Keynesian economy with rule-of-thumb consumers and capital accumulation. In particular, we focus on the inter-action between monetary policy and tax distortions in supporting the saddle-path equilibrium under the assumptions of balanced budget and monetary policy satisfying a Taylor rule.rule-of-thumb consumers, equilibrium determinacy, fiscal and monetary policy inter-actions, and tax distortions

Heterogeneous consumers, demand regimes, monetary policy and equilibrium determinacy

This paper investigates the effects of monetary policy in presence of heterogeneous consumers. We study the effectiveness (quantitative effects) of monetary policy and equilibrium determinacy properties of a New Keynesian DSGE model where a fraction of households cannot smooth consumption. We show that two-demand regimes can emerge (according to the “slope” of IS curve) and that the main unconventional results, stressed by recent literature, only hold in the unconventional case of an IS curve positively sloped.Heterogeneous consumers, liquidity constraints, determinacy, demand regimes

Efficacy of Monetary Policy and Limited Asset Market Participation

A common wisdom argues that limited asset market participation reduces the efficacy of monetary policy. This paper investigates this issue in the context of the New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. Despite limited participation actually reduces effects of interest rate policies by reducing the effect on inter-temporal allocation of consumption, we find an opposite result. Monetary policy becomes more effective as long as the share of agents who cannot access to the financial market increases. The reason has a very Keynesian flavor.Consumers’ heterogeneity, efficacy of monetary policy, rule- of-thumb.

Partisanship and fiscal policy co-ordination in a monetary union

The recent economic literature shows a new interest in the links between politics and economics. In this paper, we join Hibbs’ partisanship theory with the literature of fiscal policies international co- ordination. Furthermore, by considering a monetary union context, we also open a new angle of view in the recent debate on the effects of the European Monetary Union. In fact, by considering the possibility of governments’ partisan behaviour, we analyse the possibility for governments of internalising macroeconomic spillovers deriving from public expenditure at a national level and investigate the interactions between fiscal and monetary authorities. This paper also partially answers recent concern for considering multi-player contexts and asymmetries in open economy analyses. Here, in fact, several kinds of co-operation and the effects of asymmetries in players' preferences are studied (e.g. the asymmetries in the governments’ preference due to their partisanship).partisanship, monetary union, international cooperation, policy games

Is corporatism feasible?

In this paper we consider a standard policy game between the Government and a union. In such a framework, we first investigate the effects of corporatism on macroeconomic performance vis-à-vis different kinds of non-co-operative equilibria. Afterwards, we introduce in the literature the issue of the feasibility of corporatism, i.e., whether and under what conditions it is in the interest of both agents to implement a corporatist approach to economic policies. We find that it is difficult to implement corporatism, although it generally increases social welfare, since it often reduces the union’s utility. In particular, we show that a micro-founded union will never find it profitable to co- operate with the Government, unless side-payments are considered. The study of this last issue is however beyond the scope of this paper.employment, inflation, trade unions, government, corporatism, policy game, feasibility

Interlocking directorates as a thrust substitute: The case of the Italian non-life insurance industry

This paper investigates the market structure of the insurance business by analyzing the (interlock) linkages among companies created by their directors. We focus on the non-life business since this is a sector relatively closed with respect to the competition with other financial activities; an absence of industry competition cannot thus be compensated by other agents. We apply the graph theory to describe the network and the principal component analysis to summarize information and verify the correlation between direct interlocking and companies’ market shares.Non-life insurance; antitrust; competition; interlocking directorates; network economics